Defeater Language and Critical Thinking

The habit of reflexively affirming current evolutionary theory is inculcated into new generations of students, too. For example, in a section on protein structure in a college biochemistry textbook we read:

Keep in mind that only a small faction of the myriads of possible [protein] sequences are likely to have unique stable conformations. Evolution has, of course, selected such sequences for use in biological systems.

Note that jaunty ‘of course.’ Yet we don’t have anywhere near sufficient experimental evidence for the book’s conclusion. The authors’ confidence isn’t based on empirical knowledge––it’s feigned knowledge. An unembellished second sentence would read plainly, ‘Such sequences are used in biological systems.”

Gratuitous affirmations of a dominant theory can mesmerize the unwary. They lull people into assuming that objectively difficult problems don’t really matter. That they’ve been solved already. Or will be solved soon. Or are unimportant. Or something. They actively distract readers from noticing an idea’s shortcoming. ‘Of course,’ students are effectively prompted, ‘everyone knows what happened here––right? You’d be blind not to see it––right?’ But the complacency isn’t the fruit of data or experiments. It comes from the powerful social force of everyone in the group nodding back, ‘Of course!’

When references to it can be dropped from explanations with no loss of information, when proffered evidence for it boils down to a circle of mutually nodding heads, alarm bells should blare that the theory is a free rider.

---Michael Behe, Darwin Devolves, 24-25.

Whether one agrees with Behe’s theory of intelligent design or not, this passage from his 2019 book, Darwin Devolves: The New Science About DNA that Challenges Evolution, is worthy of consideration for those that claim to seek truth.

The finiteness of the human experience requires that we absorb certain assumptions on faith. William Clifford famously claimed that accepting something as true with insufficient evidence was morally wrong. His exaggerated bid for empiricism, however, is simply impossible. We simply lack the time, energy, and objectivity to evaluate all truth claims exhaustively.

And yet, there are times when falling into the habit of accepting a consensus understanding of something can be decidedly unhelpful. At times, advances in technology and society are held back because “everyone knows” that something is true. Everyone knew that darker skin meant an inferior person through much of the early modern period. There was apparent evidence in the “primitive” quality of African culture, for example. But more often, the point was assumed in Western cultures rather than proved in more than a cursory way.

Cursory proof often takes the form of appeals to consensus to fill in limited available information, creating the image of a comprehensive and convincing argument. As Behe points out, these arguments are often much less convincing when they are presented without the logical “defeaters.”

Words like “obviously,” “of course,” and “clearly” can be useful rhetorical terms. There are points at which the evidence is so consistent that one can claim that something “clearly” indicates something else. But these are also dangerous terms that can be used to defeat sound arguments without engaging them.

When an expert in the field states that “clearly” something must be true. Or that “obviously” this leads to that, they might be skipping some important evidence. Or––a popular tactic among revisionist biblical scholars––“the best scholars argue” for a particular position they are often trying to subvert a really contentious debate by presenting a certain way of thinking as “best” when it simply agrees with their position. Orthodox biblical scholars sometimes do the same thing, of course, dismissing valuable readings from revisionist scholars without fully considering them simply because the individual does not approach the Bible as an authentic testimony to God’s working in history; that presumption does have significant impacts on the resultant reading of Scripture, but—as the saying goes—sometimes a blind squirrel finds a nut.

In any case, it’s worth thinking about the way arguments are put on display and the amount of defeater language that is used. It should raise red flags in our minds when we read “obviously,” “clearly,” or “certainly” in places where they are not needed. It may be that the author is conveying a greater amount of confidence than the evidence warrants.

Darwin Devolves: The New Science About DNA That Challenges Evolution

By Behe, Michael J.

Buy on Amazon

Unmasking Moral Disagreements

One of the challenges of living within the diverse community that is a local congregation is that people will come to widely different conclusions about what is good and right, especially on questions that Scripture doesn’t speak directly to or that involve rapidly evolving data.

Aside from the more egregious examples, which often are due to radically different understandings of Scripture, there are often a wide range of lesser issues that have moral implications and on which disagreement is not grounds for complete disassociation.

Right now, as people grapple with floods of conflicting information about how to deal with a novel virus, there are different perspectives on whether to wear masks, whether to ignore guidelines limiting the size of gatherings, etc.

Some have clearer moral answers than others. For example, given the currently available data, it is fairly clear to me that wearing masks properly in enclosed spaces is a moral duty to protect those around me. There are some that disagree, some for honest, well-meaning reasons. Others have poorer reasons but are unlikely to be convinced of a change of mind based on any argumentation.

This is a time to reason well, look out for our neighbor, but also to show as much grace as we can to those that disagree.

Managing Moral Disagreement

How do we engage with other believers that disagree with us on contested moral topics?

Scripture is timeless truth, it is God’s gift to us that should form our moral conscience and direct our lives.

Paul’s letter to the church at Rome recognizes that Christians are likely to encounter people inside and outside the church who have differing perspectives on moral matters. His advice is simple: “If possible, so far as it depends on you, live peaceably with all.” (Rom 12:18)

This is hard to do. When your neighbor plays music too loud, it is hard not to want to be rude back.

Sometimes it is even harder when there are moral questions in play and we have a close personal connection and concern for their well-being.

Do we have a duty to try to convince someone of our moral position?

The answer, I think, is that it depends.

There is a reason why the author of Proverbs 26:4-5 gave us this little chestnut:

“Answer not a fool according to his folly,
    lest you be like him yourself.
Answer a fool according to his folly,
    lest he be wise in his own eyes.”

This has been pointed out as an apparent contradiction in Scripture by some skeptics, but it is just an example that shows that sometimes we have a duty to speak and at other times we do not.

Certainly, when we see someone about to devastate their life with sin we have a duty to speak to them to try to convince them to head toward the truth. As James urges his readers:

“My brothers, if anyone among you wanders from the truth and someone brings him back, let him know that whoever brings back a sinner from his wandering will save his soul from death and will cover a multitude of sins.” (5:19-20)

Sometimes we have a duty to speak, but we ought to do so consistently with the significance of the moral concern and our relational proximity to the one we are addressing.

By analogy, we would take much more significant action if we saw our next-door neighbor about to accidentally spray weed killer in his eye rather than a stranger in another town about to get himself with water from his hose. Proximity and danger make a difference as to the appropriate response.

In a similar way, we might strongly believe that a particular TV show is morally corrosive, but our response to knowing a fellow Christian is absorbed in that show is different than if they are considering a contract to become an adult entertainer or discussing the logistics for adultery. Our cousin’s Facebook friend whom we’ve never met is not the primary concern of our efforts in discipleship and holding up signs condemning people at a gay pride parade is unlikely to do any good.

In areas of concern that are less likely to lead to imminent harm, wisdom should have us speaking clearly to minimize that harm. We may have to repeat ourselves to be heard.

In areas that are questionable, we ought to speak to those nearest and especially to those who are likely to listen to us. We state our case, move on, and do not violate our conscience.

When it comes to moral matters in the church, we have a duty not to stir up dissent. (Titus 3:9) It’s fine to raise concerns, but once we’ve had the first round of discussions, it does little good to keep hammering away to try to score a win by getting our own way in the debate.

Many conflicts in the church would be resolved if people were a bit more concerned with their own holiness and a bit less concerned with other people’s holiness. This is what Jesus was speaking of in Matthew 7:1–5. Of course, that passage has been abused to shut down all forms of contrary advice in some circles. None of us can ever claim to be without a log yet we have a duty to speak in some cases, but the duty to self-examine clearly needs to be considered before we rush to speak.

Masks and the Church

So what do we do when we believe mask wearing is a moral duty and other people refuse to do so?

Sometimes we just have to get used to watching people be wrong. Most of us social conservatives have found ways to live and work with people that have radically diverse opinions on many other issues, and some of these pandemic issues are no different.

The prudent path seems to be voice our opinion as carefully as we can and then let the discussion move on. We do, however, have an obligation not to participate in something that offends our conscience.

The ultimate aim of wearing a mask is to limit our ability to spread the disease. It is for the good of our neighbor, not for our own protection. We are showing concern for our neighbor by limiting our comfort and freedom for their good. Unfortunately, since most homemade or simple surgical masks are ineffective at preventing the wearer from getting infected, mask wearing only works if it is done widely in appropriate settings.

Therefore, if we are part of a congregation that does not mandate measures to reduce the spread of the disease, and we believe that we have a moral duty to limit its spread, then we have a moral obligation not to participate in activities that encourage the spread of the virus. In other words, in this situation, it would be appropriate to continue to livestream or participate in other ways that do not require us to violate our conscience. If we get infected because of a lack of care by those around us, then we have the potential to spread the disease and are not fulfilling our moral duty. If a church decides to conduct services without requiring measures designed to reduce the spread of COVID-19, they should recognize they are obligating some of their congregants to stay away.

But the mask wearers have no duty police those that choose not to wear a mask. Make your case and then take appropriate action. Don’t stalk people’s Instagram accounts to make insulting comments about distance and mask wearing. And, certainly, don’t allow yourself to hope they get someone sick so you can say, “I told you so.” Masks will only be necessary for a season. In a couple of years, the controversy will be a distant memory. It isn’t worth immolating friendships or division of the church over this issue, even if it is worth remaining apart for a time.

And the non-mask wearers should not look down on those who see mask wearing as a moral duty. If mask wearers won’t come to a gathering of people that aren’t taking precautions, recognize that they are following the course they believe is necessary to be faithful to Christ in this life. Imputing motive (e.g., by calling mask wearers cowards) is not Christlike, especially when there is strong evidence that wearing a mask may be an effective way of showing neighbor love. This is what 1 Corinthians 8 is all about. However, if you are asked to wear a mask at church or in another gathering, you should do so, even if you feel it to be unnecessary. As the Apostle Paul explains, liberty is always sacrificed and never demanded.

Conclusion

These same principles apply with our choices in entertainment, the consumption of alcohol, and other things that have nothing to do with a pandemic. We provide counsel to people based on our proximity and the possible harm. In cases of lower harm, if our advice is not taken, we make the choice that protects our conscience, and, as much as possible, accommodates the conscience of our brother or sister.

Especially as misinformation—intentional and unintentional—continues to spread around an evolving situation, we have to navigate these fields with humility. That doesn’t mean that we don’t correct the obvious conspiracy theories or falsehoods, but it does mean that some people are simply going to arrive at incorrect conclusions. In fact, it is possible that our conclusions, which are also driven by available data, may be incorrect.

Grace will help ease the situation in the short term and bring us back together in the long term. In the end, God will adjudicate the rightness or a moral action, and Christ’s blood will cover the deficiencies of the ones in error.

How to Think - A Review

It is an understatement to argue that our nation and, indeed, the world is significantly divided. This is not a new phenomenon, really, though the nature of the division is somewhat different. Anyone who lived through the social polarizations of the Vietnam era in the US is likely to recognize some similar patterns of division, especially in the apparently significant division of thought between younger and older generations.

However, as Neil Postman shows in his classic volume, Entertaining Ourselves to Death, our culture has cultivated an alternative epistemology by producing and consuming media that shape us in ways that tend to undermine our ability to sustain cogent thought for extended periods of time. My review of that book left more questions than answers about how to overcome this seismic shift in the way we know.

In his book, How to Think: A Survival Guide for a World at Odds, Alan Jacobs actively tackles that challenge, offering an approach to thinking that promises to begin to unravel the tangled know to social dissonance.

Summary

After outlining the problem and its significance in the introduction to his book, Jacobs proceeds to offer some helpful considerations of the nature of thinking and how to do it better. For example, he begins by arguing that thinking must be done in community. Despite the intellectual isolation that often gets attributed to Descartes––I think, therefore I am––Jacobs shows that solitary thinking, divorced from the community, results in antisocial rationalities that often lead to internal conflicts within someone’s vision of the world. Thinking together helps form people for community and sharpen thinking to prevent rational inconsistencies.

Part of thinking together, as Jacobs notes, is ensuring we come to an understanding of the position of others before we respond. Much of our division is the result of people actively misrepresenting their intellectual opponent’s position. This is enabled by our contemporary social climate because there is a prevalence of repulsion to outgroups, whose status of being gross justifies people’s ignorance of their position. For example, many academics (by their own writing) actively despise orthodox Christians and the feeling is reciprocated in many cases, not least because of a regular pattern of condescension and abuse. Those who think will have to overcome our tribalism and seek to understand the position of humans with whom we disagree.

Add to the social dynamic the confusion of communication forums and you have a recipe for incomprehensibility. For example, there are few forms of communication that have a defined audience. The internet makes it possible for someone’s offhand comment or argument shaped for a particular hearer to be dissected, masticated, and hurled back at the writer with incredible bile. For example, a few years ago, TGC contributor, Gaye Clarke write an article about her transformation regarding her views on race and humanity. The article was, fairly plainly, intended to help white evangelicals remove their racial blinders. The language she used, therefore, did not match the latest terminology and Clarke was trolled, abused, and harassed by activists who find her terms repugnant. The article was removed, the woman defamed, and the prejudices of Clarke’s intended audience against “Social Justice Warriors” was confirmed. The conversation has no defined borders. Similarly, the “Sea Lion” phenomena, is when someone overhears (literally or on the internet) a comment not intended for them and persistently harasses the participants in the conversation demanding a response. The technique does much to further division and little to aid communication.

Division is augmented and fertilized by attempts to change and control vocabulary. The standard terminology from five years ago is this year’s hate speech. Or, certain terminology is considered to be permitted only to people within a special demographic. The point is rarely to further human knowledge, but more often to create a power dynamic that disadvantages someone from an out group. For example, the term social justice arose from Roman Catholic literature, but has since been coopted to imply a whole host of anti-human policies. Likewise, the political left is getting increasingly belligerent in their insistence that the only “pro-life” position is full socialism. Jacobs show that words matter, how we use them is important, and that thinking people have to sometimes get beyond delimiting terminology to actually examine differing the support for other positions.

Another critical aspect of Jacobs’ treatise is his undermining the idea that an “open mind” is the ideal state for thinking individuals. While he spends multiple chapters encouraging people to carefully consider other positions and to active reevaluate their own, he is also clear in arguing the point in seeing is not to go on seeing through things, but to actually see some things clearly. Channeling Chesterton, Jacobs argues that the only purpose of an open mind is to close on something solid, like a mouth. So, being a person that thinks does not mean being an ideological drifter.

Finally, How to Think is encouraging, even after all the work Jacobs recommends, because it shows that being a thinking person is well worth the effort. Becoming better thinkers is the only way we are going to get out of the mess we are in.

Conclusion

How to Think is a worthwhile book. It is relatively short, concise, but very important. Although I came into the book agreeing with Jacobs—especially about the importance of thinking—there were multiple times where his examples stepped on my toes and made me reconsider the way I argue and respond to arguments.

For those who want to reach others—to really engage and persuade—this is the sort of volume that can help someone break through barriers and, perhaps, lead even hostile voices on the opposite side of the issue change their minds. Or, at worst, even if it doesn’t help us persuade, it can help us understand and therefore reduce the frustration with our ongoing ideological deadlock.

How to Think: A Survival Guide for a World at Odds

By Alan Jacobs

Buy on Amazon